Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):267 – 285 (1991)
|Abstract||Gambles which induce the decision-maker to experience ambiguity about the relative likelihood of events often give rise to ambiguity-seeking and ambiguity-avoidance, which imply violation of additivity and Savage's axioms. The inability of the subjective Bayesian theory to account for these empirical regularities has determined a dichotomy between normative and descriptive views of subjective probability. This paper proposes a framework within which the two perspectives can be reconciled. First, a formal definition of ambiguity is given over a continuum ranging from ignorance to risk, and including ambiguous contexts as subsets. Second, it is shown that the systems of inductive logic account for the effects of ambiguity. Then, Carnap's X-system is applied as a psychological model and compared to Einhorn and Hogarth's non-normative psychological model. Finally, the implications of this research to the modeling of subjective probability judgements are discussed.|
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