David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 4 (2):267 – 285 (1991)
Gambles which induce the decision-maker to experience ambiguity about the relative likelihood of events often give rise to ambiguity-seeking and ambiguity-avoidance, which imply violation of additivity and Savage's axioms. The inability of the subjective Bayesian theory to account for these empirical regularities has determined a dichotomy between normative and descriptive views of subjective probability. This paper proposes a framework within which the two perspectives can be reconciled. First, a formal definition of ambiguity is given over a continuum ranging from ignorance to risk, and including ambiguous contexts as subsets. Second, it is shown that the systems of inductive logic account for the effects of ambiguity. Then, Carnap's X-system is applied as a psychological model and compared to Einhorn and Hogarth's non-normative psychological model. Finally, the implications of this research to the modeling of subjective probability judgements are discussed.
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References found in this work BETA
John Maynard Keynes (1921/2004). A Treatise on Probability. Dover Publications.
Rudolf Carnap (1952). The Continuum of Inductive Methods. [Chicago]University of Chicago Press.
Frank Knight (1921). Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. University of Chicago Press.
John von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern (1945). Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Journal of Philosophy 42 (20):550-554.
Harold Jeffreys (1940). Theory of Probability. Journal of Philosophy 37 (19):524-528.
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