David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (3):405-422 (2003)
James Ladyman has argued that constructive empiricism entails modal realism, and that this renders constructive empiricism untenable. We maintain that constructive empiricism is compatible with modal nominalism. Although the central term ‘observable’ has been analyzed in terms of counterfactuals, and in general counterfactuals do not have objective truth conditions, the property of being observable is not a modal property, and hence there are objective, non-modal facts about what is observable. Both modal nominalism and constructive empiricism require clarification in the face of Ladyman's argument. But we also argue that, even if Ladyman were right that constructive empiricism entails modal realism, this would not be a problem for constructive empiricism. 1 Introduction 2 Concerning (A) ‘The entire view is stated in modal discourse’ 3 Concerning (B) ‘The central term "observable" is a modal term’ 3.1 A devastating argument? 3.2 Critique of the argument 4 The objectivity of ‘observable’ 4.1 A specific empirical question 4.2 Viewing ourselves as our own measuring instruments 5 Concerning (C) ‘Scientific theories involve irreducible modality’ 6 Serious tension at the motivational level?
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Citations of this work BETA
F. A. Muller (2011). Withering Away, Weakly. Synthese 180 (2):223 - 233.
James Ladyman (2011). The Scientistic Stance: The Empirical and Materialist Stances Reconciled. Synthese 178 (1):87 - 98.
Jamin Asay & S. Seth Bordner (2015). A Modest Defense of Manifestationalism. Synthese 192 (1):147-161.
Marc Alspector-Kelly (2006). Constructive Empiricism and Epistemic Modesty: Response to van Fraassen and Monton. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 64 (3):371-379.
Gabriele Contessa (2006). Constructive Empiricism, Observability, and Three Kinds of Ontological Commitment. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 37 (4):454–468.
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