David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):571-590 (2008)
Abstract: Despite all the critical scrutiny they have received recently, contextualist views in philosophy are still not well understood. Neither contextualists nor their opponents have been entirely clear about what contextualist theses amount to and what they are based on. In this article I show that there are actually two kinds of contextualist view that rest on two very different semantic phenomena, namely, semantic incompleteness and semantic indeterminacy . I explain how contextualist approaches can be used to dissolve certain debates in philosophy. According to such approaches, the same philosophical thesis can be correctly endorsed in some contexts and correctly denied in others: it is thus pointless to seek a context-independent solution to debates about this thesis. My purpose is not to defend particular contextualist views but to lay out the general framework on which they rest: this allows us to see more clearly the similarities and differences among contextualist views defended in various areas of philosophy.
|Keywords||vagueness contextualism incompleteness knowledge indeterminacy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Stephen P. Stich (1983). From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. MIT Press.
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
John Perry (2009). Reference and Reflexivity. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Timothy Williamson (1994). Vagueness. Routledge.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Josef Stern (2006). Metaphor, Literal, Literalism. Mind and Language 21 (3):243–279.
Ishani Maitra (2007). How and Why to Be a Moderate Contextualist. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics. Oxford University Press 111-132.
Ram Neta (2002). S Knows That P. Noûs 36 (4):663–681.
John Fennell (2013). “The Meaning of 'Meaning is Normative' ”. Philosophical Investigations 36 (1):56-78.
Maja Malec (2009). Essentialism Contextualized. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):201-217.
Stefano Predelli (2005). Painted Leaves, Context, and Semantic Analysis. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3):351 - 374.
Michael Hughes (2013). Problems for Contrastive Closure: Resolved and Regained. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):577-590.
D. Pritchard (2002). Two Forms of Epistemological Contextualism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):19-55.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads51 ( #85,380 of 1,911,320 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #96,279 of 1,911,320 )
How can I increase my downloads?