Philosophy of Science 62 (2):261-82 (1995)
|Abstract||With some regularity, cognitive scientists seem to introduce cognitive values into their explanations. After identifying examples of this practice, I sketch an account of psychological explanation that, under certain conditions, legitimizes value-laden cognitive explanations in which evaluative claims appear in the explanandum. I then present and discuss two applications of the proposed account in order to show its viability and explore its consequences|
|Keywords||Cognitive Science Perception Psychology Science Value|
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