God, fine-tuning, and the problem of old evidence
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):405-424 (2006)
| Abstract | The fundamental constants that are involved in the laws of physics which describe our universe are finely tuned for life, in the sense that if some of the constants had slightly different values life could not exist. Some people hold that this provides evidence for the existence of God. I will present a probabilistic version of this fine-tuning argument which is stronger than all other versions in the literature. Nevertheless, I will show that one can have reasonable opinions such that the fine-tuning argument doesn't lead to an increase in one's probability for the existence of God. The fine-tuning argument Objective versus subjective probability Observational selection effects The problem of old evidence Against the fine-tuning argument Many universes. | |||||||||
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Neil A. Manson (2000). There is No Adequate Definition of ?Fine-Tuned for Life? Inquiry 43 (3):341 – 351.
Mark A. Walker & M. Milan (2006). Astrophysical Fine Tuning, Naturalism, and the Contemporary Design Argument. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (3):285 – 307.
Graham Wood (2006). The Fine-Tuning Argument: The ‘Design Inference’ Version. Religious Studies 42 (4):467-471.
Mark Colyvan, Jay L. Garfield & Graham Priest (2005). Problems with the Argument From Fine Tuning. Synthese 145 (3):325 - 338.
R. White (2011). What Fine-Tuning's Got to Do with It: A Reply to Weisberg. Analysis 71 (4):676-679.
John Roberts (2012). Fine-Tuning and the Infrared Bull's-Eye. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):287-303.
Neil A. Manson (2009). The Fine-Tuning Argument. Philosophy Compass 4 (1):271-286.
Bradley Monton (2006). God, Fine-Tuning, and the Problem of Old Evidence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2):405-424.
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