David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):61-80 (2001)
I am going to argue that it is time to come to terms with the difficulty of understanding what it means to be physical and start thinking about the mind-body problem from a new perspective. Instead of construing it as the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally physical world, we should think of it as the problem of finding a place for mentality in a fundamentally nonmental world, a world that is at its most fundamental level entirely nonmental. The mind-body problem, I want to argue, is the problem of determining whether mentality can be accounted for in terms of nonmental phenomena. In other words, it is the question, ‘is mentality a fundamental feature of the world’
|Keywords||Metaphysics Mind-body Physicalism Science Descartes Kim, J|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jessica M. Wilson (2006). On Characterizing the Physical. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):61-99.
Barbara Montero (2006). Physicalism in an Infinitely Decomposable World. Erkentnis 64 (2):177-191.
Barbara Montero (2007). Physicalism Could Be True Even If Mary Learns Something New. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):176-189.
Janice Dowell (2006). Formulating the Thesis of Physicalism: An Introduction. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):1-23.
Barbara Montero (2003). The Epistemic/Ontic Divide. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):404-418.
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