Physicalism could be true even if Mary learns something new

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):176-189 (2007)
Abstract
Mary knows all there is to know about physics, chemistry and neurophysiology, yet has never experienced colour. Most philosophers think that if Mary learns something genuinely new upon seeing colour for the first time, then physicalism is false. I argue, however, that physicalism is consistent with Mary's acquisition of new information. Indeed, even if she has perfect powers of deduction, and higher-level physical facts are a priori deducible from lower-level ones, Mary may still lack concepts which are required in order to deduce from the lower-level physical facts what it is like to see red
Keywords QUALIA
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.478.x
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References found in this work BETA
Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Barbara Montero (2001). Post-Physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):61-80.
Philip Kitcher (1980). A Priori Knowledge. Philosophical Review 89 (1):3-23.

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Sam Coleman (2009). Why the Ability Hypothesis is Best Forgotten. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):74-97.
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