Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):176-189 (2007)
|Abstract||Mary knows all there is to know about physics, chemistry and neurophysiology, yet has never experienced colour. Most philosophers think that if Mary learns something genuinely new upon seeing colour for the first time, then physicalism is false. I argue, however, that physicalism is consistent with Mary's acquisition of new information. Indeed, even if she has perfect powers of deduction, and higher-level physical facts are a priori deducible from lower-level ones, Mary may still lack concepts which are required in order to deduce from the lower-level physical facts what it is like to see red|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Frank Jackson (1986). What Mary Didn't Know. Journal of Philosophy 83 (May):291-5.
Sam Coleman (2009). Why the Ability Hypothesis is Best Forgotten. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):74-97.
Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.) (2007/2009). Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Luca Malatesti (2008). Mary's Scientific Knowledge. Prolegomena 7 (1):37-59.
Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Epistemological Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):1-23.
Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Introduction to There's Something About Mary. In Peter Ludlow, Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), There's Something About Mary.
Daniel Stoljar (2003). Introduction. In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. The Mit Press.
George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2000). Mary Mary, Quite Contrary. Philosophical Studies 99 (1):59-87.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads69 ( #15,401 of 722,876 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,876 )
How can I increase my downloads?