David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):176-189 (2007)
Mary knows all there is to know about physics, chemistry and neurophysiology, yet has never experienced colour. Most philosophers think that if Mary learns something genuinely new upon seeing colour for the first time, then physicalism is false. I argue, however, that physicalism is consistent with Mary's acquisition of new information. Indeed, even if she has perfect powers of deduction, and higher-level physical facts are a priori deducible from lower-level ones, Mary may still lack concepts which are required in order to deduce from the lower-level physical facts what it is like to see red
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson (2001). Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation. Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.
Paul M. Churchland (1985). Reduction, Qualia and the Direct Introspection of Brain States. Journal of Philosophy 82 (January):8-28.
Barbara Montero (2001). Post-Physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (2):61-80.
Philip Kitcher (1980). A Priori Knowledge. Philosophical Review 89 (1):3-23.
Citations of this work BETA
Robert J. Howell (2015). The Physicalist's Tight Squeeze: A Posteriori Physicalism Vs. A Priori Physicalism. Philosophy Compass 10 (12):905-913.
Similar books and articles
Daniel Stoljar (2003). Introduction. In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. The MIT Press
Torin Alter (1998). A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument. Philosophical Studies 90 (1):35-56.
Jesper Kallestrup (2006). Epistemological Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (1):1-23.
Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Introduction to There's Something About Mary. In Peter Ludlow, Daniel Stoljar & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), There's Something About Mary.
Luca Malatesti (2008). Mary's Scientific Knowledge. Prolegomena 7 (1):37-59.
Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.) (2006). Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Frank Jackson (1986). What Mary Didn't Know. Journal of Philosophy 83 (May):291-5.
Robert Cummins, Martin Roth & Ian Harmon (2014). Why It Doesn't Matter to Metaphysics What Mary Learns. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):541-555.
Sam Coleman (2009). Why the Ability Hypothesis is Best Forgotten. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):74-97.
Dunja Jutronic (2004). The Knowledge Argument--Some Comments. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):193-197.
George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (2000). Mary Mary, Quite Contrary. Philosophical Studies 99 (1):59-87.
Terence E. Horgan (1984). Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 34 (April):147-83.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads109 ( #36,955 of 1,911,472 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #60,500 of 1,911,472 )
How can I increase my downloads?