Personal Identity and Self as Narrative : Formal Identity and Narrative Identity as Two Essential Building Blocks in the Constitution of Self
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
This thesis gives an overview of the topic of personal identity from a philosophical viewpoint, describing both numerical and qualitative aspects. Reductionist approaches to numerical identity, such as the neo-Lockean psychological continuity theory of Derek Parfit or the physical criterion theory of Bernard Williams, are subject to a discussion. Apart from some significant criticisms in detail, there is the more general problem that they appear to imply a kind of neo-dualism. As a consequence, the author suggests a holistic approach to numerical personal identity which is more in accord with our times, placing the body firmly at the center of focus. The section on qualitative identity aims to develop a more complex theory of psychological continuity and continuity per se than that generally found in the literature. The suggestion is made that the most viable way to bring together the various strands of personal identity, both numerical and qualitative, is a concept of narrativity. Narratives are both indicative of and constitutive of personal identity.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
M. Schectman (1994). The Truth About Memory. Philosophical Psychology 7 (1):3-18.
Eric T. Olson (2006). Is There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity? In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and Modality. Oxford University Press 242.
Igor Douven (1999). Marc Slors on Personal Identity. Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):143 – 149.
Thane Plantikow (2008). Surviving Personal Identity Theory: Recovering Interpretability. Hypatia 23 (4):pp. 90-109.
Harold W. Noonan (1989). Personal Identity. Routledge.
Kim Atkins (2004). Narrative Identity, Practical Identity and Ethical Subjectivity. Continental Philosophy Review 37 (3):341-366.
David Shoemaker (2010). The Insignificance of Personal Identity for Bioethics. Bioethics 24 (9):481-489.
Simon Beck (2008). Going Narrative: Schechtman and the Russians. South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):69-79.
David DeGrazia (2005). Human Identity and Bioethics. Cambridge University Press.
Added to index2010-07-24
Total downloads47 ( #94,251 of 1,934,735 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #269,884 of 1,934,735 )
How can I increase my downloads?