David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Metaphilosophy 38 (1):71–87 (2007)
In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is "epistemic" in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and "practical" in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of "inner epistemic virtue" to the "outer risks" implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.
|Keywords||epistemic virtue epistemic responsibility ethics of belief justification|
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Ryan Bevan (2011). The Question of Conscientiousness and Religious Engagement in Public Schools. Studies in Philosophy and Education 30 (3):257-269.
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