The doomsday argument without knowledge of birth rank
Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):79–82 (2003)
| Abstract | The Carter-Leslie Doomsday argument, as standardly presented, relies on the assumption that you have knowledge of your approximate birth rank. I demonstrate that the Doomsday argument can still be given in a situation where you have no knowledge of your birth rank. This allows one to reply to Bostrom's defense of the Doomsday argument against the refutation based on the idea that your existence makes it more likely that many observers exist. | |||||||||
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