The logic, intentionality, and phenomenology of emotion

Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192 (2009)
Abstract
My concern in this paper is with the intentionality of emotions. Desires and cognitions are the traditional paradigm cases of intentional attitudes, and one very direct approach to the question of the intentionality of emotions is to treat it as sui generis—as on a par with the intentionality of desires and cognitions but in no way reducible to it. A more common approach seeks to reduce the intentionality of emotions to the intentionality of familiar intentional attitudes like desires and cognitions. In this paper, I argue for the sui generis approach.
Keywords Emotion  Intentionality  Phenomenology  Consciousness  Logic  Frege puzzles  Content
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1993). A World of States of Affairs. Philosophical Perspectives 7:429-440.
George Bealer (1993). A Solution to Frege's Puzzle. Philosophical Perspectives 7:17-60.
Louis C. Charland (2002). The Natural Kind Status of Emotion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (4):511-37.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jennifer Radden (2013). Delusions Redux. Mind and Language 28 (1):125-139.
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