David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 85 (November):279-314 (1990)
I offer support for the view that physicalist theories of cognition don't reduce to neurophysiological theories. On my view, the mind-brain relationship is to be explained in terms of evolutionary forces, some of which tug in the direction of a reductionistic mind-brain relationship, and some of which which tug in the opposite direction. This theory of forces makes possible an anti-reductionist account of the cognitive mind-brain relationship which avoids psychophysical anomalism. This theory thus also responds to the complaint which arguably lies behind the Churchlands' strongest criticisms of anti-reductionism — namely the complaint that anti-reductionists fail to supply principled explanations for the character of the mind-brain relationship. While lending support to anti-reductionism, the view defended here also insures a permanent place for mind-brain reduction as an explanatory ideal analogous to Newtonian inertial motion or Aristotelian natural motion
|Keywords||Brain Cognitive Psychology Metaphysics Mind Reductionism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Paul M. Churchland (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78 (February):67-90.
Paul M. Churchland (1982). Is 'Thinker' a Natural Kind? Dialogue 21 (June):223-38.
Donald Davidson (1970). Mental Events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press. 79-101.
Citations of this work BETA
Richard Montgomery (1989). Does Epistemology Reduce to Cognitive Psychology? Philosophia 19 (2-3):245-263.
Similar books and articles
M. Ruz (2006). Let the Brain Explain the Mind: The Case of Attention. Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):495-505.
John Bickle (1992). Mental Anomaly and the New Mind-Brain Reductionism. Philosophy of Science 59 (2):217-30.
Valerie Gray Hardcastle (1992). Reduction, Explanatory Extension, and the Mind/Brain Sciences. Philosophy of Science 59 (3):408-28.
Don Ross & David Spurrett (2004). What to Say to a Skeptical Metaphysician? A Defense Manual for Cognitive and Behavioral Scientists. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):603-627.
Mark Crooks (2002). Intertheoretic Identification and Mind-Brain Reductionism. Journal of Mind and Behavior 23 (3):193-222.
Steven W. Horst (2007). Beyond Reduction: Philosophy of Mind and Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press.
Robert C. Richardson (1999). Cognitive Science and Neuroscience: New Wave Reductionism. Philosopical Psychology 12 (3):297-307.
Claudia M. Murphy (1984). Anti-Reductionism and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophy Research Archives 10:441-454.
Camilo J. Cela-Conde & Gisèle Marty (1997). Mind Architecture and Brain Architecture. Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):327-340.
Joseph M. Notterman (2000). Note on Reductionism in Cognitive Psychology: Reification of Cognitive Processes Into Mind, Mind-Brain Equivalence, and Brain-Computer Analogy. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):116-121.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads52 ( #33,836 of 1,102,037 )
Recent downloads (6 months)24 ( #8,373 of 1,102,037 )
How can I increase my downloads?