The voluntariness of virtue – and belief

Philosophy 83 (3):373-390 (2008)
This paper examines the relative voluntariness of three types of virtue: 'epistemic' virtues like open-mindedness; 'motivational' virtues like courage, and more robustly 'moral' virtues like justice. A somewhat novel conception of the voluntariness of belief is offered in terms of the limited, but quite real, voluntariness of certain epistemic virtues
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819108000739
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