Virtue and voluntarism

Synthese 161 (3):393 - 402 (2008)
My aim here is to characterize a certain type of ‘virtue approach’ to questions of responsibility for belief; then to explore the extent to which this is helpful with respect to one fundamental puzzle raised by the claims that we have, and that we do not have, voluntary control over our beliefs; and then ultimately to attempt a more exact statement of doxastic responsibility and, with it a plausible statement of ‘weak doxastic voluntarism.’.
Keywords pistemic virtue  Responsibility for belief  Doxastic voluntarism
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References found in this work BETA
John Heil (1983). Doxastic Agency. Philosophical Studies 43 (3):355 - 364.
Keith Lehrer (1990). Metamind. Oxford University Press.

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