David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 17 (1):136-144 (2007)
This study investigates whether the conscious awareness of action is based on predictive motor control processes, or on inferential “sense-making” process that occur after the action itself. We investigated whether the temporal binding between perceptual estimates of operant actions and their effects depends on the occurrence of the effect (inferential processes) or on the prediction that the effect will occur (predictive processes). By varying the probability with which a simple manual action produced an auditory effect, we showed that both the actual and the predicted occurrence of the effect played a role. When predictability of the effect of action was low, temporal binding was found only on those trials where the auditory effect occurred. In contrast, when predictability of the effect of action was high, temporal binding occurred even on trials where the action produced no effect. Further analysis showed that the predictive process is modulated by recent experience of the action-effect relation. We conclude that the experience of action depends on a dynamic combination of predictive and inferential processes.
|Keywords||info:mesh/Psychomotor Performance info:mesh/Time Perception info:mesh/Causality info:mesh/Humans info:mesh/Adult info:mesh/Awareness info:mesh/Adolescent info:mesh/Internal-External Control info:mesh/Intention info:mesh/Analysis of Variance info:mesh/Male info:mesh/Female Adolescent Adult Analysis of Variance Awareness Causality Female Humans Intention Internal-External Control Male Psychomotor Performance Time Perception|
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References found in this work BETA
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Citations of this work BETA
Elisabeth Pacherie (2008). The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework. Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.
James W. Moore & P. C. Fletcher (2012). Sense of Agency in Health and Disease: A Review of Cue Integration Approaches. [REVIEW] Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):59-68.
James W. Moore & Sukhvinder S. Obhi (2012). Intentional Binding and the Sense of Agency: A Review. Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1):546-561.
James W. Moore, Daniel M. Wegner & Patrick Haggard (2009). Modulating the Sense of Agency with External Cues. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (4):1056-1064.
James W. Moore, David Lagnado, Darvany C. Deal & Patrick Haggard (2009). Feelings of Control: Contingency Determines Experience of Action. Cognition 110 (2):279-283.
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