A second-person approach cannot explain intentionality in social understanding

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):430-431 (2013)
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Abstract

A second-person approach that prioritizes dyadic emotional interaction is not well equipped to explain the origins of the understanding of mind conceived as intentionality. Instead, the critical elements that will deliver the understanding of self and other as persons with intentionality are shared object-centered interactions that include not only emotional engagement, but also joint attention and joint goal-directed action

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