Explanatory exclusion and extensional individuation

Acta Analytica 24 (3):211-222 (2009)
Abstract
Jaegwon Kim’s principle of Explanatory Exclusion says there can be no more than a single complete and independent explanation of any one event. Accordingly, if we have a complete neurological explanation for some piece of human behavior, the mental explanation must either be excluded, or it must not be distinct from the neurological explanation. Jaegwon Kim argues that mental explanations are not distinct from neurological explanations on account of the fact that they refer to the same objective causal relation between events. A number of critics have argued that this extensional model of explanatory individuation allows for too many descriptions to state the same explanation. In this paper I consider, and ultimately reject, a possible response to these critics called the Constitutive Property Reply.
Keywords Exclusion  Causation  Explanation  Events  Properties  Jaegwon Kim
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan Bennett (1991). Reply to Reviewers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (3):647 - 662.
Simon Evnine (1991). Donald Davidson. Stanford University Press.

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