Explanatory exclusion and extensional individuation
Acta Analytica 24 (3):211-222 (2009)
| Abstract | Jaegwon Kim’s principle of Explanatory Exclusion says there can be no more than a single complete and independent explanation of any one event. Accordingly, if we have a complete neurological explanation for some piece of human behavior, the mental explanation must either be excluded, or it must not be distinct from the neurological explanation. Jaegwon Kim argues that mental explanations are not distinct from neurological explanations on account of the fact that they refer to the same objective causal relation between events. A number of critics have argued that this extensional model of explanatory individuation allows for too many descriptions to state the same explanation. In this paper I consider, and ultimately reject, a possible response to these critics called the Constitutive Property Reply. | |||||||||
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Lee McIntyre (2002). Supervenience and Explanatory Exclusion (Superveniencia y Exclusión Explicativa). Crítica 34 (100):87 - 101.
Jaegwon Kim (1990). Explanatory Exclusion and the Problem of Mental Causation. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology. Blackwell.
Karsten R. Stueber (2005). Mental Causation and the Paradoxes of Explanation. Philosophical Studies 122 (3):243-77.
Neil Campbell & Dwayne Moore (2009). On Kim's Exclusion Principle. Synthese 169 (1):75 - 90.
JeeLoo Liu (2001). A Nonreductionist's Solution to Kim's Explanatory Exclusion Problem. Manuscrito 24 (1).
Jesper Kallestrup (2006). The Causal Exclusion Argument. Philosophical Studies 131 (2):459-85.
Jaegwon Kim (1989). Mechanism, Purpose, and Explanatory Exclusion. Philosophical Perspectives 3:77-108.
Mark Day (2004). Explanatory Exclusion History and Social Science. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 34 (1):20-37.
Sophie C. Gibb (2009). Explanatory Exclusion and Causal Exclusion. Erkenntnis 71 (2):205 - 221.
Neil Campbell (2010). Explanatory Exclusion and the Intensionality of Explanation. Theoria 76 (3):207-220.
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