Intrinsic Value

Ethics (2006)
Abstract
In this final chapter, Moore rebuts egoism and upholds the view that it is always our duty to perform that action, of the various ones open to us, the total consequences of which will have the greatest intrinsic value. He criticizes the hedonistic doctrine that one whole is intrinsically better than another when, and only when, it contains more pleasure. He rejects not only the idea that intrinsic value is proportional to pleasure, but also that it is proportional to any other single factor. He concludes by distinguishing different senses in which a thing can be good or bad.
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DOI 10.1093/0199272018.003.0009
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