Kovesi and the Formal and Material Elements of Concepts
Philosophia 39 (4):699-720 (2011)
| Abstract | In his seminal work Moral Notions , Julius Kovesi presents a novel account of concept formation. At the heart of this account is a distinction between what he terms the material element and the formal element of concepts. This paper elucidates his distinction in detail and contrasts it with other distinctions such as form-matter, universal-particular, genus-difference, necessary-sufficient, and open texture-closed texture. We situate Kovesi’s distinction within his general philosophical method, outlining his views on concept formation in general and explain how his theory of concept formation is applied in moral philosophy | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,631 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesRenate Bartsch (1996). The Relationship Between Connectionist Models and a Dynamic Data-Oriented Theory of Concept Formation. Synthese 108 (3):421 - 454.
John MacFarlane (2000). What Does It Mean to Say That Logic is Formal? Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
Richard E. Aquila (1988). Self-Consciousness, Self-Determination, and Imagination in Kant. Topoi 7 (1):65-79.
Julius Kovesi (1976). The Concept of Structuralism: A Critical Analysis By Philip Pettit Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1975. £4.95. Philosophy 51 (198):485-.
Peter Van Inwagen (1990). Material Beings. Cornell University Press.
Mukesh J. Patel (1994). Concept Formation: A Complex Adaptative Approach. Theoria 9 (1):89-108.
Julius Kovesi (1967). Moral Notions. New York, Humanities P..
Jörgen Sjögren (2010). A Note on the Relation Between Formal and Informal Proof. Acta Analytica 25 (4):447-458.
John Drysdale (1996). How Are Social-Scientific Concepts Formed? A Reconstruction of Max Weber's Theory of Concept Formation. Sociological Theory 14 (1):71-88.
Jonathan Ellis (2005). Colour Irrealism and the Formation of Colour Concepts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):53-73.
Julius Kovesi (1978). Against the Ritual of "is" and "Ought". Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1):5-16.
Julius Kovesi (1977). Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding Edited by Edo Pivčević Cambridge University Press, £6.50, £2.25 Paper. Philosophy 52 (199):105-.
Gad Freudenthal (1995). Aristotle's Theory of Material Substance: Heat and Pneuma, Form and Soul. Oxford University Press.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-03-14Total downloads19 ( #64,257 of 548,972 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,511 of 548,972 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
