Remembering entails knowing

Synthese 190 (14):2717-2729 (2013)
Abstract
In his recent book, Bernecker (Memory, 2010) has attacked the following prominent view: (RK) S remembers that p only if S knows that p. An attack on RK is also an attack on Timothy Williamson’s view that knowledge is the most general factive stative attitude. In this paper, I defend RK against Bernecker’s attacks and also advance new arguments in favor of it. In Sect. 2, I provide some background on memory. In Sect 3, I respond to Bernecker’s attacks on RK and develop a new argument for RK. In Sects. 4 and 5, I develop two more new arguments for RK
Keywords Memory  Remembering  Belief  Knowledge  Bernecker  Williamson
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