Remembering entails knowing

Synthese (forthcoming)
Abstract In his recent book, Bernecker (Memory, 2010 ) has attacked the following prominent view: (RK) S remembers that p only if S knows that p . An attack on RK is also an attack on Timothy Williamson’s view that knowledge is the most general factive stative attitude. In this paper, I defend RK against Bernecker’s attacks and also advance new arguments in favor of it. In Sect. 2, I provide some background on memory. In Sect 3, I respond to Bernecker’s attacks on RK and develop a new argument for RK. In Sects. 4 and 5, I develop two more new arguments for RK.
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    Sven Bernecker (2007). Remembering Without Knowing. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):137 – 156.
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