Role Functionalism and Epiphenomenalism

Philosophia 39 (3):511-525 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The type-type reductive identity of the mental to the physical was once the dominant position in the mental causation debate. In time this consensus was overturned, largely due to its inability to handle the problem of multiple realizability. In its place a nonreductive position emerged which often included an adherence to functionalism. Functionalism construes mental properties as functional states of an organism, which in turn have specific physical realizers. This nonreductive form of functionalism, henceforth called role functionalism, has faced a number of criticisms itself. Chief among these is the concern that the realizer of the functional role is causally sufficient, so the role property does not make a contribution of its own. In this paper I argue that there is a way for unreduced functional properties to play a role after all. This is done by conceiving of functional properties as higher level functional properties of a macro system which determine that its realizers will play the roles that they play.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Is role-functionalism committed to epiphenomenalism?Brian P. McLaughlin - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):39-66.
From Realizer Functionalism to Nonreductive Physicalism.JeeLoo Liu - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 42:149-160.
Making the Change: the Functionalist’s Way.Paul Noordhof - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (2):233-50.
Symposium on Mechanisms in Mind.Carl Gillett - 2007 - Journal of Philosophical Research 32:1-2.
Against functional reductionism in cognitive science.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (3):319 – 333.
Levels, orders and the causal status of mental properties.Simone Gozzano - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):347-362.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-02-11

Downloads
117 (#140,738)

6 months
9 (#144,029)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Dwayne Moore
University of Saskatchewan

Citations of this work

Add more citations