Warrant does entail truth
Synthese 184 (3):287-297 (2012)
| Abstract | Let ‘warrant’ denote whatever precisely it is that makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. A current debate in epistemology asks whether warrant entails truth, i.e., whether (Infallibilism) S’s belief that p is warranted only if p is true. The arguments for infallibilism have come under considerable and, as of yet, unanswered objections. In this paper, I will defend infallibilism. In Part I, I advance a new argument for infallibilism; the basic outline is as follows. Suppose fallibilism is true. An implication of fallibilism is that the property that makes the difference between knowledge and mere belief (which I dub ‘warrant*’) is the conjunctive property being warranted and true . I show that this implication of fallibilism conflicts with an uncontroversial thesis we have learned from reflection on Gettier cases: that nonaccidental truth is a constituent of warrant*. It follows that infallibilism is true. In the second part of the paper, I present and criticize a new argument against infallibilism. The argument states that there are plausible cases where, intuitively, the only thing that is keeping a belief from counting as knowledge is the falsity of that belief. Furthermore, it is plausible that such a belief is warranted and false. So, the argument goes, infallibilism is false. I show that this argument fails. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesDaniel Howard-Snyder (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304-327.
E. J. Coffman (2008). Warrant Without Truth? Synthese 162 (2):173 - 194.
Neil Feit (2003). Infallibilism and Gettier's Legacy. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.
Trenton Merricks (1997). More on Warrant's Entailing Truth. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):627-631.
Joel Pust (2000). Warrant and Analysis. Analysis 60 (1):51–57.
Andrew M. Bailey (2010). Warrant is Unique. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):297-304.
Jeremy Fantl (2009). Knowledge in an Uncertain World. Oxford University Press.
Dylan Dodd (2011). Against Fallibilism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685.
Juan Comesaña (2005). Justified Vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383.
Juan Comesaña (2005). Justified Vs. Warranted Perceptual Belief: Resisting Disjunctivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):367-383.
Richard M. Gale (2001). Alvin Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief. Philo 4 (2):138-147.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2012-01-03Total downloads29 ( #42,416 of 549,122 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,122 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
