David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Acta Analytica 27 (1):1-8 (2012)
The concepts of knowledge and accomplishment are duals. There are many parallels between them. In this paper I discuss the "AA" thesis, which is dual to the well known KK thesis. The KK thesis claims that if someone knows something, then she knows that she knows it. This is generally thought to be false, and there are powerful reasons for rejecting it. The AA thesis claims that if someone accomplishes something, then she accomplishes that she accomplishes it. I argue that this, too, is false, and that the reasons it is false parallel reasons for the falsity of the KK thesis
|Keywords||Knowledge Accomplishment Externalism Sosa Williamson Second order knowledge Second order acccomplishment|
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References found in this work BETA
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Duncan Pritchard (2005). Epistemic Luck. Clarendon Press.
Ernest Sosa (2010). Knowing Full Well. Princeton University Press.
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