Are the bundle theory and the substratum theory really twin Brothers?

Axiomathes 19 (1):73--85 (2009)
In a recent paper, Jiri Benovsky argues that the bundle theory and the substratum theory, traditionally regarded as ‘deadly enemies’ in the metaphysics literature, are in fact ‘twin brothers’. That is, they turn out to be ‘equivalent for all theoretical purposes’ upon analysis. The only exception, according to Benovsky, is a particular version of the bundle theory whose distinguishing features render unappealing. In the present reply article, I critically analyse these undoubtedly relevant claims, and reject them.
Keywords Bare particular  Substratum  Compresence  Ontology  Equivalence  Property  Identity  Individuation  Haecceitism  Identity of the Indiscernibles  Perdurantism  Endurantism
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DOI 10.1007/s10516-008-9053-0
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References found in this work BETA
Theodore Sider (2006). Bare Particulars. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):387–397.
Simon Saunders (2003). Physics and Leibniz's Principles. In Katherine Brading & Elena Castellani (eds.), Symmetries in Physics: Philosophical Reflections. Cambridge University Press 289--307.

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Andrew M. Bailey (2012). No Bare Particulars. Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.

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