Graduate studies at Western
Axiomathes 19 (1):73--85 (2009)
|Abstract||In a recent paper, Jiri Benovsky argues that the bundle theory and the substratum theory, traditionally regarded as ‘deadly enemies’ in the metaphysics literature, are in fact ‘twin brothers’. That is, they turn out to be ‘equivalent for all theoretical purposes’ upon analysis. The only exception, according to Benovsky, is a particular version of the bundle theory whose distinguishing features render unappealing. In the present reply article, I critically analyse these undoubtedly relevant claims, and reject them.|
|Keywords||Bare particular Substratum Compresence Ontology Equivalence Property Identity Individuation Haecceitism Identity of the Indiscernibles Perdurantism Endurantism|
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