Contingent Creatures: Reward Event Theory of Motivation

Rowman & Littlefield (1995)
Abstract
What motivates behavior? What are the qualities of experience which make life worth living? Taking a new interdisciplinary approach, Morillo advances the theory that pleasure—interpreted as a distinct, separable, noncognitive quality of experience—is essential for all positive motivation and is the only intrinsic, nonmoral good in the lives of human beings and many other sentient creatures. Morillo supports her arguments with recent neuropsychological evidence concerning the role of reward centers in the brain and philosophical arguments for a naturalistic theory of value and the good life. "Contingent Creatures" will interest philosophers, psychologists, and neurobiologists.
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