Desert and distributive justice in a theory of justice

Journal of Social Philosophy 33 (1):131–143 (2002)
Abstract
Some writers think that John Rawls rejects desert as a distributive criterion because he thinks that people are not capable of deserving anything. I argue that Rawls does not think this, and that he rejects desert because he thinks that we cannot tell what people deserve. I then offer a criticism of Rawls's rejection of desert based on its correct interpretation.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,747
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Citations of this work BETA
David Alm (2010). Desert and the Control Asymmetry. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):361 - 375.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

72 ( #18,952 of 1,098,832 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #33,456 of 1,098,832 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.