David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Human Studies 31 (4):399 - 421 (2008)
This article studies the phenomenology of chronic illness in light of phenomenology’s insights into ecstatic temporality and freedom. It shows how a chronic illness can, in lived experience, manifest itself as a disturbance of our usual relation to ecstatic temporality and thence as a disturbance of freedom. This suggests that ecstatic temporality is related to another sort of time—“provisional time”—that is in turn rooted in the body. The article draws on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Heidegger’s Being and Time , shedding light on the latter’s concept of ecstatic temporality. It also discusses implications for self-management of chronic illness, especially in children.
|Keywords||Heidegger Merleau-Ponty diabetes temporality body phenomenology chronic illness compliance|
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References found in this work BETA
Evan Thompson (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Harvard University Press.
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (2011). The Primacy of Movement. John Benjamins Pub..
Dan Zahavi (2005). Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
Shaun Gallagher & Dan Zahavi (2007). The Phenomenological Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science. Routledge.
Citations of this work BETA
Alexandra Pârvan (2015). Patients' Substantialization of Disease, the Hybrid Symptom Andmetaphysical Care. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 21 (3):380-388.
Donald S. Borrett (2013). Heidegger, Gestell and Rehabilitation of the Biomedical Model. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 19 (3):497-500.
Tania L. Gergel (2013). Illness Perception, Time Perception and Phenomenology – an Extended Response to Borrett. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 19 (3):501-508.
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David Morris (2006). Ecstatic Body, Ecstatic Nature: Perception as Breaking with the World. Chiasmi International 8:201-217.
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S. Kay Toombs (1990). The Temporality of Illness: Four Levels of Experience. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 11 (3).
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Stuart F. Spicker (1973). Inner Time and Lived-Through Time: Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 4 (October):235-247.
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