Denying the doctrine and changing the subject

Journal of Philosophy 70 (15):503-510 (1973)
I discuss Quine's claim that anyone denying what we now take to be a logical truth would be using logical words in a novel way. I trace this to a confusions between outright denial and failure to assert, and assertion of a negation. (This abstract is written from memory decades after the article.)
Keywords Quine  change of logic  logical truth
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.2307/2025282
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William H. Hanson (1989). Two Kinds of Deviance. History and Philosophy of Logic 10 (1):15-28.

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