Extensional and non-truth-functional contexts

Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):159-164 (1969)
I discuss Frege's argument - later called the slingshot - that if a construction is extensional and preserves logical equivalence then it is truth-functional. I consider some simple apparent counterexamples and conclude that they are not sentence-embedding in the required way.
Keywords slingshot  Frege argument
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.2307/2024331
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