For-itself and in-itself in Sartre and Merleau-ponty

Philosophy Today 17 (4):311-318 (1973)
Abstract
It is argued that in beginning ``being and nothingness'' with the absolute ontological distinction between the for-itself (pure nothingness) and the in-itself (pure being), sartre makes it impossible to understand how the phenomenological account of experience which comes later in the work could be correct. attention is paid almost entirely to the critique of sartre implicit in the chapter of merleau-ponty's ``phenomenology of perception'' titled 'the cogito'. merleau-ponty's divergence from sartre is seen to center around his critique of sartre on the nature of the in-itself, the world, and the pre-reflective 'cogito'.
Keywords Metaphysics consciousness ontology phenomenology
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