Geometry of logic and truth approximation

In this paper it is argued that the theory of truth approximation should be pursued in the framework of some kind of geometry of logic. More specifically it is shown that the theory of interval structures provides a general framework for dealing with matters of truth approximation. The qualitative and the quantitative accounts of truthlikeness turn out to be special cases of the interval account. This suggests that there is no principled gap between the qualitative and quantitative approach. Rather, there is a connected spectrum of ways of measuring truthlikeness depending on the specifics of the context in which it takes place.
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