Global Scepticism, Underdetermination and Metaphysical Possibility

Erkenntnis 79 (2):1-23 (2014)
Abstract
I focus on a key argument for global external world scepticism resting on the underdetermination thesis: the argument according to which we cannot know any proposition about our physical environment because sense evidence for it equally justifies some sceptical alternative (e.g. the Cartesian demon conjecture). I contend that the underdetermination argument can go through only if the controversial thesis that conceivability is per se a source of evidence for metaphysical possibility is true. I also suggest a reason to doubt that conceivability is per se a source of evidence for metaphysical possibility, and thus to doubt the underdetermination argument
Keywords global scepticism  underdetermination argument  metaphysical possibility
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    References found in this work BETA
    James Beebe (2010). Constraints on Sceptical Hypotheses. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):449 - 470.
    James Beebe (2009). The Abductivist Reply to Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):605 - 636.
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