Husserl and Brentano on intentionality

Abstract
THIS ARTICLE IS AN ATTEMPT TO EXPOUND AND DISTINGUISH\nBRENTANO'S CONCEPT OF "INTENTIONAL INEXISTENCE" (FOUND IN\n'PSYCHOLOGIE VON EINEM EMPIRISCHEN STANDPUNKT') AND\nHUSSERL'S EARLY CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY (IN 'LOGISCHE\nUNTERSUCHUNGEN'). THE MAIN PURPOSE IS TO SHOW THAT\nHUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL VIEWS ARE VERY DIFFERENT FROM\nAND FAR MORE DEVELOPED THAN BRENTANO'S AND THAT HE REJECTS\nMANY OF HIS CONCEPTS AND DOCTRINES. FIRST, BRENTANO'S\nDESIGNATION OF EIGHT DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF MENTAL\nPHENOMENA, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO DEFINE PSYCHOLOGY, IS\nOUTLINED. THIS IS FOLLOWED BY A DETAILED DISCUSSION OF\nHUSSERL'S CRITICISMS AND REVISIONS, EMPHASIZING WHAT\nHUSSERL THOUGHT WAS BRENTANO'S MOST IMPORTANT INSIGHT,\nI.E., THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS INTENTIONAL. A DISCUSSION OF\nTHREE VIEWS OF THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IS GIVEN,\nCONCLUDING WITH HUSSERL'S GENERAL CRITICISMS THAT BRENTANO\nFELL VICTIM TO DUALISM AND REPRESENTATIONALISM AND THAT HIS\nCONCEPT OF THE INTENTIONAL NATURE OF MIND WAS DISTORTED BY\nA COMMITMENT TO NATURALISM, THE LATTER BEING OVERCOME ONLY\nBY HUSSERL'S OWN TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY IN 'IDEEN'\nAND LATER WORKS
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