Graduate studies at Western
Faith and Philosophy 12 (1):95-112 (1995)
|Abstract||A widely adopted approach to end-of-life ethical questions fails to make explicit certain crucial metaphysical ideas entailed by it and when those ideas are clarified, then it can be shown to be inadequate. These metaphysical themes cluster around the notions of personal identity, personhood and humanness, and the metaphysics of substance. In order to clarify and critique the approach just mentioned, I focus on the writings of Robert N. Wennberg as a paradigm case by, first, stating his views of personal identity, humanness, personhood, and the relations among them; second, offering a comparison of a view of humans as substances (understood in the classic interpretation of Aristotle and Aquinas) vs. a view of humans as property-things; third, applying the metaphysical distinctions surfaced in the second section towards a critique of Wennberg|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Marya Schechtman (2010). Personhood and the Practical. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (4):271-283.
Sirkku Kristiina Hellsten (2000). Towards an Alternative Approach to Personhood in the End of Life Questions. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 21 (6):515-536.
J. Wentzel van Huyssteen (2010). When Were We Persons? Why Hominid Evolution Holds the Key to Embodied Personhood. Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie Und Religionsphilosophie 52 (4).
Timothy Murphy (2012). The Afterlife of Embryonic Persons: What a Strange Place Heaven Must Be. Reproductive Biomedicine Online 25:684-688.
Michael Quante (2005). Personal Identity Between Survival and Integrity. Poiesis and Praxis 4 (2):145-161.
Tom L. Beauchamp (1999). The Failure of Theories of Personhood. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 9 (4):309-324.
Angela Campbell, Kathleen Cranley Glass & Louis C. Charland (1998). Describing Our “Humanness”: Can Genetic Science Alter What It Means to Be “Human”? Science and Engineering Ethics 4 (4):413-426.
Bruce Morito (1989). Fundamental Ontology and Personal Identity: A Critique of Albert Shalom's View of Personhood. The Review of Metaphysics 42 (4):797 - 815.
Elisa Aaltola (2008). Personhood and Animals. Environmental Ethics 30 (2):175-193.
John P. Lizza (1999). Defining Death for Persons and Human Organisms. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 20 (5):439-453.
John P. Christman (2004). Narrative Unity as a Condition of Personhood. Metaphilosophy 35 (5):695-713.
Timothy Chappell (2011). On the Very Idea of Criteria for Personhood. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):1-27.
John D. Greenwood (1993). Split Brains and Singular Personhood. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):285-306.
Added to index2011-12-01
Total downloads8 ( #131,816 of 739,352 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,186 of 739,352 )
How can I increase my downloads?