In defense of methodological solipsism: A reply to Noonan

Philosophical Studies 45 (May):399-412 (1984)
Abstract
Noonan's arguments against methodological solipsism ("methodological solipsism," "philosophical studies" 4, 1981) assumes that mental states are individuated by (russellian) content; this assumption entails that narrowness and wideness are intrinsic to mental states. I propose an alternative "extrinsic" reading of methodological solipsism, According to which narrowness and wideness are modes of attribution of mental states, And thus reject the doctrine of individuation by russellian content. Noonan's arguments fail against this version of methodological solipsism
Keywords Epistemology  Explanation  Mental States  Methodology  Solipsism
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    References found in this work BETA
    Simon Blackburn & Jane Heal (1979). Thought and Things. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 53:23 - 59.
    Harold W. Noonan (1981). Methodological Solipsism. Philosophical Studies 40 (September):269-274.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Lynne Rudder Baker (1985). A Farewell to Functionalism. Philosophical Studies 48 (July):1-14.
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