In defence of state-based reasons to intend

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (2):208-228 (2010)
A state-based reason for one to intend to perform an action F is a reason for one to intend to F which is not a reason for one to F. Are there any state-based reasons to intend? According to the Explanatory Argument, the answer is no, because state-based reasons do not satisfy a certain explanatory constraint. I argue that whether or not the constraint is correct, the Explanatory Argument is unsound, because state-based reasons do satisfy the constraint. The considerations that undermine the Explanatory Argument also generate a strong, positive case for the existence of state-based reasons to intend.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2010.01365.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive James Morauta, In defence of state-based reasons to intend
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Pamela Hieronymi (2005). The Wrong Kind of Reason. Journal of Philosophy 102 (9):437 - 457.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Thomas H. Smith (2011). Playing One's Part. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):213-44.
Jonathan Way (2012). Explaining the Instrumental Principle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):487-506.
Russ Shafer-Landau (2009). A Defence of Categorical Reasons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2):189-206.
Olle Blomberg (2011). Socially Extended Intentions-in-Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):335-353.
Christopher Woodard (2008). A New Argument Against Rule Consequentialism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11 (3):247 - 261.
Mark Schroeder (2007). The Humean Theory of Reasons. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Vol. 2. Oxford University Press 195--219.
Christopher Woodard (2003). Group-Based Reasons for Action. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (2):215-229.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

817 ( #673 of 1,911,313 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

187 ( #605 of 1,911,313 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.