In defence of dogmatism
| Abstract | According to Jim Pryor’s dogmatism, when you have an experience with content p, you have prima facie justification to believe p that does not rest on your independent justification or evidence to believe any proposition. Although dogmatism is intuitive and seems to have an antisceptical punch, it has been targeted by different objections. In this paper I aim to answer the objections by Roger White according to which dogmatism is incoherent with the Bayesian account of how evidence affects rational credences. If this were true, the rational acceptability of dogmatism would be seriously questionable. I respond that these objections don’t get off the ground because they assume that experiences and reports of experience have the same evidential force, whereas the dogmatist is uncommitted to this assumption. I also elucidate what gives dogmatism its antisceptical punch by drawing from recent papers by Brian Weatherson, Peter Kung and Pryor himself in which alternative responses to White’s challenge are delineated. I argue that my rejoinder is more complete and simpler than these responses, for the latter permit White’s objections to go through in many cases, whereas my response doesn’t. Furthermore according to these responses, dogmatism is tenable only if Bayesianism is replaced with alternative formal frameworks, which is not a requirement of my rejoinder | |||||||||
| Keywords | dogmatism Bayesianism perceptual justification immediate justification global scepticism Jim Pryor Roger White | |||||||||
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