David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Faith and Philosophy 2 (3):257-264 (1985)
In an impressive series of books and articles, Alvin Plantinga has developed challenging new versions of two much discussed pieces of philosophical theology: the free will defense and the ontological argument.' His treatment of both subjects has provoked a tremendous amount of critical comment. What has not been generally noticed', however, is that when taken together, Plantinga's views on these two subjects lead to a very serious problem in philosophical theology. The premises of his version of the ontological argument, when combined with the presuppositions of the free will defense, appear to entail that God is not free to choose between good and evil and thus is not "good" in the distinctively moral sense of this word. In the present paper, I shall explain how this problem arises, and explore two different ways of trying to deal with it
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Ishtiyaque Haji (2009). A Conundrum Concerning Creation. Sophia 48 (1):1-14.
Similar books and articles
Robert T. Lehe (1986). God's Perfection and Freedom. Faith and Philosophy 3 (3):319-323.
David Basinger (1982). Anderson on Plantinga. Philosophy Research Archives 8:315-320.
Alexander R. Pruss (2012). A Counterexample to Plantinga's Free Will Defense. Faith and Philosophy 29 (4):400-415.
A. M. Weisberger (1995). Depravity, Divine Responsibility and Moral Evil: A Critique of a New Free Will Defence. Religious Studies 31 (3):375-390.
Daniel Howard-Snyder & John Hawthorne (1998). Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga's Free Will Defense. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 44 (1):1-21.
Kenneth Boyce (2011). Non-Moral Evil and the Free Will Defense. Faith and Philosophy 28 (4):371-384.
Wes Morriston (2000). What is so Good About Moral Freedom? Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):344-358.
Richard M. Gale (1990). Freedom and the Free Will Defense. Social Theory and Practice 16 (3):397-423.
Daniel Howard-Snyder (2013). The Logical Problem of Evil: Mackie and Plantinga. In Justin McBrayer & Daniel Howard-Snyder (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil. Wiley-Blackwell. 19-33.
James Cain (2004). Free Will and the Problem of Evil. Religious Studies 40 (4):437-456.
William Hasker (2005). Can God Be Free?: Rowe's Dilemma for Theology. Religious Studies 41 (4):453-462.
A. A. Howsepian (2007). Compatibilism, Evil, and the Free-Will Defense. Sophia 46 (3):217-236.
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (1994). He Who Lapse Last Lapse Best: Plantinga on Leibniz'Lapse. Southwest Philosophy Review 10:137-146.
Chansoo Park (2008). Plantinga and Leibniz's the best world. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 45:527-533.
Kevin Timpe (2007). Truth-Making and Divine Eternity. Religious Studies 43 (3):299 - 315.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads16 ( #106,421 of 1,099,694 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #186,613 of 1,099,694 )
How can I increase my downloads?