David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):77 – 83 (1997)
Conscious awareness of intentionality is considered to be a product of specialized monitoring processes which distinguish intentional, goal-directed actions from unintentional, passive/ reactive actions. When goals are not met or unfavourable conditions arise, this ability to distinguish intentional and unintentional enables us to direct adaptive efforts towards either changing plans and goals or towards altering the environment. The formulation is discussed in relation to monitoring theories of consciousness and the concept of 'locus of control', and is developed to explain several common psychological disorders in terms of dysfunctional monitoring of intentions. It is suggested that it could provide a theoretical basis for psychological treatment methods.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.) (1988). Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press.
Gerald M. Edelman (1989). The Remembered Present: A Biological Theory of Consciousness. Basic Books.
Ernest R. Hilgard (1977). Divided Consciousness: Multiple Controls in Human Thought and Action. Wiley.
Lawrence Weiskrantz (1988). Some Contributions of Neuropsychology of Vision and Memory to the Problem of Consciousness. In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Oxford University Press
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Robert G. Kunzendorf (2000). Individual Differences in Self-Conscious Source Monitoring: Theoretical, Experimental, and Clinical Considerations. In Robert G. Kunzendorf & B. Alan Wallace (eds.), Individual Differences in Conscious Experience. John Benjamins
René Jagnow (2012). Colour Discrimination And Monitoring Theories of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):57 - 74.
Giuliana Mazzoni (2003). Animals Show Monitoring, but Does Monitoring Imply Awareness? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):349-350.
M. K. Spehn & L. M. Reder (2000). The Unconscious Feeling of Knowing: A Commentary on Koriat's Paper. Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):187-192.
Tillmann Vierkant (2005). Owning Intentions and Moral Responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (5):507 - 534.
Bernard J. Baars (1998). Attention, Self, and Conscious Self-Monitoring. In A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness. Cambridge University Press
Suparna Choudhury & Sarah-Jayne Blakemore (2006). Intentions, Actions, and the Self. In Susan Pockett, William P. Banks & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Does Consciousness Cause Behavior? MIT Press 39-51.
P. Cicogna & M. Bosinelli (2001). Consciousness During Dreams. Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):26-41.
Arthur R. Miller (1981). Ii. Intentions and Conditions of Satisfaction. Inquiry 24 (1):115 – 121.
Uriah Kriegel (2006). The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press 143--170.
Added to index2009-03-08
Total downloads6 ( #336,406 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #369,877 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?