Legal positivism and legal disagreements

Ratio Juris 22 (1):62-73 (2009)
Abstract
This paper deals with the possibility of faultless disagreement in law. It does this by looking to other spheres in which faultless disagreement appears to be possible, mainly in matters of taste and ethics. Three possible accounts are explored: the realist account, the relativist account, and the expressivist account. The paper tries to show that in the case of legal disagreements, there is a place for an approach that can take into account our intuitions in the sense that legal disagreements are genuine and at times faultless.
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References found in this work BETA
Dan López de Sa (2007). The Many Relativisms and the Question of Disagreement. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):269 – 279.

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Citations of this work BETA
Valerio Nitrato Izzo (2012). Beyond Consensus: Law, Disagreement and Democracy. [REVIEW] International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 25 (4):563-575.
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