David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 26 (6):913-924 (2013)
This paper offers an inconsistent model of motion perception. It was prompted by work on inconsistent motion due to Hegel and, following him, Priest. But the paper skirts Hegel's full scale idealism, by proposing that the inconsistency is with the cognitive contents of motion perception. The paper draws on work in the psychology of perception, and in the theory of inconsistency. I begin by noting the prima facie argument that temporal change threatens inconsistency, and canvassing ways in which this might be avoided. The orthodox reply to the prima facie argument is that one and the same thing can have different incompatible properties at different times. This is plausible when applied to motion in the physical world. However, applied to cognition, it can be seen that the phenomenon of phi or beta, combined with the mechanism of a Reichardt detector, lends support to one key step in the prima facie argument, namely re-identification over time. The inconsistency of the model is then seen to follow from application of the Fade Principle. Advantages of the model are stressed: including a simple explanation of the debilitating condition of akinetopsia, that is, motion blindness; and a suggestion as to how to account for the “moving now.”
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References found in this work BETA
David K. Lewis (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell Publishers.
G. Priest, R. Routley & J. Norman (eds.) (1989). Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent. Philosophia Verlag.
O. Sacks & A. Freeman (1994). An Anthropologist on Mars. Journal of Consciousness Studies 1 (2):234-240.
M. J. Petry, G. W. F. Hegel, A. V. Miller & J. N. Findlay (1970). Science of Logic. Philosophical Quarterly 20 (80):273.
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