Marr's Theory of Vision and the Argument from Success

This paper considers the implications of David Marr's computational theory of vision for the issues of individualism and methodological solipsism. A recent argument that the theory is nonindividualistic is shown to be similar to Gibson's arguments for "direct perception." The paper argues that a complete analysis of Marr's theory must take into account Marr's rejection of Gibson's approach, and that such an analysis shows Marr's theory to be consistent with methodological solipsism as a research strategy.
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Mark Rollins (1994). Perception and Proper Explanatory Width. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:437 - 445.
Robert Francescotti (1991). Externalism and Marr's Theory of Vision. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (June):227-38.
Daniel Gilman (1994). Simplicity, Cognition and Adaptation: Some Remarks on Marr's Theory of Vision. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:454 - 464.

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