Philosophia 37 (3):441-454 (2009)
|Abstract||Although Hume has no developed semantic theory, in the heyday of analytic philosophy he was criticized for his “meaning empiricism,” which supposedly committed him to a private world of ideas, led him to champion a genetic account of meaning instead of an analytic one, and confused “impressions” with “perceptions of an objective realm.” But another look at Hume’s “meaning empiricism” reveals that his criterion for cognitive content, the cornerstone both of his resolutely anti-metaphysical stance and his naturalistic “science of human nature,” provides the basis for a successful response to his critics. Central to his program for reforming philosophy, Hume’s use of the criterion has two distinct aspects: a critical or negative aspect, which assesses the content of the central notions of metaphysical theories to demonstrate their unintelligibility; and a constructive or positive aspect, which accurately determines the cognitive content of terms and ideas.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
C. J. L. Talmage (1994). Literal Meaning, Conventional Meaning and First Meaning. Erkenntnis 40 (2):213 - 225.
Walter Ott (2006). Hume on Meaning. Hume Studies 32 (2):233-252.
Robert C. Cummins & Martin Roth (forthcoming). Meaning and Content in Cognitive Science. In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. de Gruyter.
Farhang Zabeeh (1960). Hume, Precursor of Modern Empiricism: An Analysis of His Opinions on Meaning, Metaphysics, Logic, and Mathematics. The Hague, M. Nijhoff.
Carl G. Hempel (1950). Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning. 11 Rev. Intern. De Philos 41:41-63.
Markus Schrenk (2008). Verificationist Theory of Meaning. In U. Windhorst, M. Binder & N. Hirowaka (eds.), Encyclopaedic Reference of Neuroscience. Springer.
M. McDermott (2001). Quine's Holism and Functionalist Holism. Mind 110 (440):977-1025.
Adrian Bardon (2007). Empiricism, Time-Awareness, and Hume's Manners of Disposition. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (1):47-63.
Walter Ott (2009). What Can Causal Claims Mean? Philosophia 37 (3):459-470.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads36 ( #38,024 of 722,813 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,982 of 722,813 )
How can I increase my downloads?