Natural predicates and topological structures of conceptual spaces
Synthese 95 (2):219 - 240 (1993)
| Abstract | In the framework of set theory we cannot distinguish between natural and non-natural predicates. To avoid this shortcoming one can use mathematical structures as conceptual spaces such that natural predicates are characterized as structurally nice subsets. In this paper topological and related structures are used for this purpose. We shall discuss several examples taken from conceptual spaces of quantum mechanics (orthoframes), and the geometric logic of refutative and affirmable assertions. In particular we deal with the problem of structurally distinguishing between natural colour predicates and Goodmanian predicates like grue and bleen. Moreover the problem of characterizing natural predicates is reformulated in such a way that its connection with the classical problem of geometric conventionalism becomes manifest. This can be used to shed some new light on Goodman's remarks on the relative entrenchment of predicates as a criterion of projectibility. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Configure |
Nino B. Cocchiarella (1992). Conceptual Realism Versus Quine on Classes and Higher-Order Logic. Synthese 90 (3):379 - 436.
Friederike Moltmann (2010). On the Semantics of Existence Predicates. In Ingo Reich (ed.), Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 15, Saarbruecken.
Michael Katz (1982). Real-Valued Models with Metric Equality and Uniformly Continuous Predicates. Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (4):772-792.
D.\'ecio Krause & Steven French (2007). Quantum Sortal Predicates. Synthese 154 (3):417 - 430.
Décio Krause & Steven French (2007). Quantum Sortal Predicates. Synthese 154 (3):417 - 430.
Rohit Parikh (1996). Vague Predicates and Language Games. Theoria 11 (3):97-107.
Peter Gärdenfors (1990). Induction, Conceptual Spaces and AI. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):78-95.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads24 ( #52,493 of 556,904 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #39,122 of 556,904 )How can I increase my downloads? |

