Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 43 (3):363-377 (1976)
|Abstract||This paper attempts to place Goodman's "New Riddle of Induction" within the context of a subjectivist understanding of inductive logic. It will be argued that predicates such as 'grue' cannot be denied projectible status in any a priori way, but must be considered in the context of a situation of inductive support. In particular, it will be argued that questions of projectibility are to be understood as a variety of questions about the ways a given sample is random. Various examples are considered, including cases when 'grue' (as opposed to 'green') should be projected, and some remarks are offered on what is meant when it is claimed that a sample is random (in ways relevant to inductive support) and how such randomness is determined. The view presented helps to make clear the relation between such apparently non-projectible predicates as 'grue' and the concept of being examined|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Branden Fitelson (2008). Goodman's "New Riddle". Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6):613 - 643.
Rainer Gottlob (1995). Emeralds Are No Chameleons — Why “Grue” is Not Projectible for Induction. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 26 (2):259 - 268.
C. A. Hooker (1968). Goodman, 'Grue' and Hempel. Philosophy of Science 35 (3):232-247.
John D. Norton, The Formal Equivalence of Grue and Green and How It Undoes the New Riddle of Induction.
Robert Kowalenko (2012). Reply to Israel on the New Riddle of Induction. Philosophia 40 (3):549-552.
Marc Lange (1994). Earman on the Projectibility of Grue. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:87 - 95.
Stephen Hetherington (2001). Why There Need Not Be Any Grue Problem About Inductive Inference as Such. Philosophy 76 (1):127-136.
Edward S. Shirley (1981). An Unnoticed Flaw in Barker and Achinstein's Solution to Goodman's New Riddle of Induction. Philosophy of Science 48 (4):611-617.
Rosemarie Rheinwald (1993). An Epistemic Solution to Goodman's New Riddle of Induction. Synthese 95 (1):55 - 76.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads10 ( #114,417 of 739,404 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,269 of 739,404 )
How can I increase my downloads?