David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):342-351 (2011)
The paper examines philosophical issues that arise in contexts where one has many different models for treating the same system. I show why in some cases this appears relatively unproblematic (models of turbulence) while others represent genuine difficulties when attempting to interpret the information that models provide (nuclear models). What the examples show is that while complementary models needn’t be a hindrance to knowledge acquisition, the kind of inconsistency present in nuclear cases is, since it is indicative of a lack of genuine theoretical understanding. It is important to note that the differences in modeling do not result directly from the status of our knowledge of turbulent flows as opposed to nuclear dynamics—both face fundamental theoretical problems in the construction and application of models. However, as we shall, the ‘problem context(s)’ in which the modeling takes plays a decisive role in evaluating the epistemic merit of the models themselves. Moreover, the theoretical difficulties that give rise to inconsistent as opposed to complementary models (in the cases I discuss) impose epistemic and methodological burdens that cannot be overcome by invoking philosophical strategies like perspectivism, paraconsistency or partial structures.
|Keywords||Models Inconsistence Turbulence Nuclear structure|
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References found in this work BETA
Gordon Belot (2007). Is Classical Electrodynamics an Inconsistent Theory? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):263-282.
Bryson Brown (1992). Old Quantum Theory: A Paraconsistent Approach. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:397 - 411.
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Demetris Portides (2011). Seeking Representations of Phenomena: Phenomenological Models. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2):334-341.
Graham Priest, Paraconsistent Logic. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Citations of this work BETA
James Griesemer (2013). Formalization and the Meaning of “Theory” in the Inexact Biological Sciences. Biological Theory 7 (4):298-310.
Robin Nunn (2012). Many‐Models Medicine: Diversity as the Best Medicine. Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):974-978.
Ann-Sophie Barwich (forthcoming). Bending Molecules or Bending the Rules? The Application of Theoretical Models in Fragrance Chemistry. Perspectives on Science:443-465.
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