David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 142 (1):81--107 (2004)
In the last decade, structural realism has been presented as the most promising strategy for developing a defensible realist view of science. Nevertheless, controversy still continues in relation to the exact meaning of the proposed structuralism. The stronger version of structural realism, the so-called ontic structural realism, has been argued for on the basis of some ideas related to quantum mechanics. In this paper, I will first outline these arguments, mainly developed by Steven French and James Ladyman, then challenge them, putting a particular emphasis on a metaphysical principle (the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles) which, even though it is crucial for the whole argument, hasn''t been, in my opinion, clearly stated and examined yet. My overall view will be that a weaker version of the form of realism we are considering is more plausible – namely, epistemic structural realism.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
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Citations of this work BETA
Roman Frigg & Ioannis Votsis (2011). Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Structural Realism but Were Afraid to Ask. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):227-276.
Peter Ainsworth (2011). Ontic Structural Realism and the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles. Erkenntnis 75 (1):67-84.
Steven French (2010). The Interdependence of Structure, Objects and Dependence. Synthese 175 (S1):89 - 109.
Edward Slowik (2012). On Structuralism's Multiple Paths Through Spacetime Theories. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):45-66.
Elaine Landry (2007). Shared Structure Need Not Be Shared Set-Structure. Synthese 158 (1):1 - 17.
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