On what makes certain dynamical systems cognitive: A minimally cognitive organization program
| Abstract | Dynamicism has provided cognitive science with important tools to understand some aspects of “how cognitive agents work” but the issue of “what makes something cognitive” has not been sufficiently addressed yet and, we argue, the former will never be complete without the latter. Behavioristic characterizations of cognitive properties are criticized in favor of an organizational approach focused on the internal dynamic relationships that constitute cognitive systems. A definition of cognition as adaptive-autonomy in the embodied and situated neurodynamic domain is provided: the compensatory regulation of a web of stability dependencies between sensorimotor structures is created and preserved during a historical/developmental process. We highlight the functional role of emotional embodiment: internal bioregulatory processes coupled to the formation and adaptive regulation of neurodynamic autonomy. Finally, we discuss a “minimally cognitive behavior program” in evolutionary simulation modeling suggesting that much is to be learned from a complementary “minimally cognitive organization program”. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,653 |
| External links |
|
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Farley Simon Nobre (2012). Governing Industrial Organizations Through Cognitive Machines. AI and Society 27 (4):501-507.
Keld Stehr Nielsen (2006). Dynamical Explanation in Cognitive Science. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (1):139 - 163.
Nigel Stepp, Anthony Chemero & Michael T. Turvey (2011). Philosophy for the Rest of Cognitive Science. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):425-437.
Frank van der Velde & Marc de Kamps (1998). Toward a Synthesis of Dynamical Systems and Classical Computation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):652-653.
Matthew Botvinick (2012). Commentary: Why I Am Not a Dynamicist. Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (1):78-83.
Michael Silberstein & Anthony Chemero (2012). Complexity and Extended Phenomenological-Cognitive Systems. Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (1):35-50.
Marco Mirolli (2012). Representations in Dynamical Embodied Agents: Re-Analyzing a Minimally Cognitive Model Agent. Cognitive Science 36 (5):870-895.
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-11-21Total downloads18 ( #67,474 of 548,984 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,327 of 548,984 )How can I increase my downloads? |

