David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Grazer Philosophische Studien 72 (1):211-231 (2006)
Timothy Williamson in his article "Necessary Existents" presents a proof of the claim that everything necessarily exists using just three seemingly uncontroversial principles relating the notions of proposition with those of truth and existence. The argument, however, may be easily blocked once the distinction, introduced by R. M. Adams, between the notions of a proposition being true in a world and of (or at) a world is introduced. In this paper I defend the plausibility of the notion of a proposition's being true of a world by rejecting two criticisms of it raised by Williamson; in the final section, I present a conception of propositions, according to which they are equivalence classes of mental representations, for which at least one of the principles comes out as false.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ferenc Huoranszki (2002). Fate, Freedom and Contingency. Acta Analytica 17 (1):79-102.
Jordan Howard Sobel (1992). Lies, Lies, and More Lies: A Plea for Propositions. Philosophical Studies 67 (1):51 - 69.
Hans van Ditmarsch, Wiebe van der Hoek & Petar Iliev (2011). Everything is Knowable – How to Get to Know Whether a Proposition is True. Theoria 78 (2):93-114.
Anssi Korhonen (2009). Russell's Early Metaphysics of Propositions. Prolegomena 8 (2):159-192.
Theodore Sider (2003). Reductive Theories of Modality. In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics. Oxford University Press 180-208.
Gregor Damschen (2010). Are There Ultimately Founded Propositions? Universitas Philosophica 54 (54):163-177.
Kevin C. Klement (2003). Russell-Myhill Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Aviv Hoffmann (2003). A Puzzle About Truth and Singular Propositions. Mind 112 (448):635-651.
George Englebretsen (2010). Making Sense of Truth-Makers. Topoi 29 (2):147-151.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads63 ( #72,663 of 1,939,032 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #218,490 of 1,939,032 )
How can I increase my downloads?