Reversibility and ereignis: On being as Kantian imagination in Merleau-ponty and Heidegger

Philosophy Today 52 (Supplement):135-143 (2008)
Abstract
This paper aims to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s difficult concept of “reversibility” by interpreting it as resuming the dialectical critique of the rationalist and empiricist tradition that informs Merleau-Ponty’s earlier work. The focus is on reversibility in “Eye and Mind,” as dismantling the traditional dualism of activity and passivity. This clarification also puts reversibility in continuity with the Phenomenology’s appropriation of Kant, letting us note an affiliation between Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility and Heidegger’s Ereignis: in each case being itself already performs the operation that Kant had located in the imagination. Reversibility discovers this Kantian imagination moving in place, Ereignis discovers it in temporality.
Keywords reversibility  Ereignis  Merleau-Ponty  Heidegger  phenomenology  Kant  imagination  ontology  activity and passivity
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